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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - EVIDENCE - OPINION
OF NON-TREATING PSYCHIATRIST BASED ON CLAIMANT'S STATEMENTS HELD INADMISSIBLE. CANDELLA V.
SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND, 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263
(1976) .
When the Maryland General Assembly first enacted the Workmen's Compensation Article,l it directed, in what is now Section 11,2
that
the Commission shall not be bound by the usual common
law or statutory rules of evidence ..• but may make the
investigation in such a manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and to carry out justly the spirit of this act.s
However, at the same time that the legislature granted this greater
latitude to the Commission with respect to the admission of evidence, it also provided for a review of Commission decisions by

1. The original Workmen's Compensation Act appears in Law of April 16, 1914,
ch. 800, §§ 1-&5, [1914] Laws of Md. 1429. The current version of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is codified in MD. ANN. CoDE art. 101, §§ 1-102 (1964) as
amended, (Supp. 1976).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 11 (1964). The present language in Section 11
formerly appeared in Section 10 of the original Act. See note 3 infra.
3. Law of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § 10, [1914] Laws of Md. 1429 (current version
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 11 (1964».
In a further effort to effectuate the benevolent purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Article, the legislature directed that U[t]he rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this article ..••" MD. ANN. CoDE art. 101, § 63 (1964). The Maryland
Court of Appeals has on several occasions stated that the article is social legislation and its provisions are to be liberally construed. However, the rule of
liberal construction has not been applied specifically to the issue of admission
of evidence. Instead, it has been applied in various situations as a general rule
of construction for the Workmen's Compensation Article. See Tavel v. Bechtel
Corp., 242 Md. 299, 219 A.2d 43 (1966) (rule applied in determination that injury while driving to work was not within the course of employment); Mureddu
v. Gentile, 233 Md. 216, 196 A.2d 82 (1964) (loss of use of leg due to knee injury could constitute permanent total disability despite specific statutory compensation for loss of leg) ; Bayshore Indus., Inc. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 192 A.2d
487 (1963) (worker'S claim, initiated after deadline for filing, allowed where
delay was induced by threats and promises by agents of employer); Watson v.
Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 90 A.2d 180 (1952) (rule applied in determination that
injury while being transported from work by employer was within the course
of employment); Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 45
A.2d 79 (1945) (rule applied in determining whether or not wife who had been
separated from her husband was totally dependent on him for support).
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the circuit courts4 in a proceeding which is essentially a trial de
novo.1i If the circuit courts,6 in reviewing Commission decisions,
are required to adhere strictly to the common law rules of evidence,
then the evidentiary freedom allowed to the Commission by statute
would be substantially undermined. Specifically, a party who relies
on hearsay testimony to obtain an award from the Commission
confronts the possibility that the very evidence used to support
that award can later be held inadmissible by the circuit court in a
trial de novo. This possibility became harsh reality for the claimant
in Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund. 7
Florence D. Candella was working as a hotel maid, when she
received a severe electrical shocks while attempting to turn off a
vacuum cleaner. She sustained no physical injury but claimed that
the shock caused emotional problems for which she sought compensation. The only expert medical testimony to support her claim
before the Commission was given by a psychiatrist, Dr. Teitelbaum.
Mrs. Candella had seen the psychiatrist on four occasions for the
purpose of qualifying him as an expert rather than for the purpose
of treatment. Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony, based solely on the
medical history given by Mrs. Candella, was that she suffered from
4. Law of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § 55, [1914] Laws of Mel. 1429 (current version
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(a) (Supp. 1976», originally provided that:
Any employer, employe, [sic] beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved by
any decision of the Commission affecting his interest under the Act may
have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal and
initiated in the Circuit Court of the County or in the Common Law Courts
of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over the place where the accident
occurred or over the person appealing from such decision, and the Court
shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts
concerning injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the
Act, whether it has misconstrued the law and the facts applicable in the case
decided.••• Upon the hearing of such appeal the Court shall, upon motion
of either party, • . . submit to a jury any question of fact involved in
such case. The proceedings in every such an appeal shall be informal and
summary, but full opportunity to be heard shall be had before judgment
is pronounced.
5. Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 245 Md. 433, 226 A2d 253 (1967); Richardson
v. Home Mutual Life Ins. Co.,235 Mel. 252, 201 A2d 34{) (1964). The trial in
the circuit court encompasses a review of both the law and the facts.
6. In this casenote the term circuit court includes the common law courts of Baltimore City.
7. 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 (1976). Florence D. Candella filed a claim with the
Workmen's Compensation Commission which granted an award on April 27, 1973,
based on a finding of permanent partial disability. The employer, insurer and
Subsequent Injury Fund appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,
which in a trial without a jury reversed the decision of the Commission. Mrs.
Candella appealed to the court of special appeals. The court of appeals granted
certiorari prior to consideration by the court of special appeals and affirmed
the decision of the circuit court. I d. at 122, 353 A2d at 264.
8. Although the court of appeals does not mention the duration or extent of the
shock, it appears that the shock was severe enough to require a fellow worker to
disconnect the vacuum cleaner from its socket with a mop handle. Brief for
Appellant at 3, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at E. 42.
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CC 'psychoneurosis, post-traumatic, with severe emotional disturbance following electric shock' ."9 The employer and insurer produced a psychiatrist who testified that the claimant "suffered from
'a very severe personality disorder' which was not causally related
to the electric shock and, in fact, antedated it."lo Based on Dr.
Teitelbaum's opinion, the Commission awarded compensation, finding that Mrs. Candella had incurred a 60 % permanent partial
industrial disability.ll The employer, insurer and Subsequent Injury Fund12 appealed to the circuit court. That court, without a
jury, heard substantially the same testimony as the Commission.
At the end of the trial de novo, the circuit court struck Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony because it was based solely on the medical history
furnished by the claimant, not for the purpose of treatment but
solely to qualify him as an expert. Without this testimony there
was no medical evidence on which to base the findings and order
of the Commission. Accordingly, the circuit court reversed the
decision of the Commission.13
On certiorari,14 the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the circuit court for two reasons. First, the court held
that the opinion of a non-treating psychiatrist based on medical
history related to him for the purpose of qualifying him as an
expert is hearsay which does not come within any recognized ex-

9. 277 Md. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264.
10. [d. at 122, 353 A.2d at 265. Although the psychiatrist who testified for the employer never treated the claimant, his opinion was admissible because it was
based not only on statements from the claimant but also on notes made by a
treating psychiatrist and on tests performed by a clinical psychologist. Appendix
to Appellant's Brief at E. SO.
11. Of the total 60% permanent partial industrial disability, the Commission attributed 50% to the accidental injury. This became the responsibility of the
insurer and employer. The remaining 10% was charged to the Subsequent Injury
Fund because the Commission found that Mrs. Candella suffered from a congenital heart impairment. The combined effects of the previous heart condition
and the injury resulted in a disability which was substantially greater than
would have ensued from the accidental injury alone. 277 Md. at 122, 353 A.2d
at 265.
12. The Subsequent Injury Fund was established to make payments to employees
who have a previous permanent impairment and who suffer a subsequent accident
resulting in personal injury for which compensation is required. To qualify for
payment from the fund the claimant must suffer an injury resulting in a permanent partial or a permanent total disability which is substantially greater, by
reason of the previous condition, than that which would have resulted from the
subsequent injury alone. The employer and insurer pay for the portion of the
disability attributable to the subsequent injury. The fund pays that portion of
the award attributable to the combined effects of the subsequent injury and the
prior disability. The Subsequent Injury Fund has the right to appeal from a
decision of the Commission awarding payment from the fund. MD. ANN. CoDK
art. 101, § 66 (Supp. 1976).
13. 277 Md. at 123, 353 A.2d at 265.
14. The court of appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the
court of special appeals. See note 7 supra.
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ception to the hearsay rule. 15 Second, the court held that, notwithstanding the legislative intent to liberalize the admission of
evidence in compensation cases, Mrs. Candella's statements to the
psychiatrist were so lacking in indicia of reliability as to deprive
them, and consequently the psychiatrist's conclusions based thereon,
of the probative value essential to admission. 16
Maryland follows the generally recognized rule that a physician
consulted for treatment may testify to the medical history given
to him by his patient.17 He may also state conclusions based on
that history.18 This exception to the hearsay rule is permitted
because the patient is likely to believe that the effectiveness of the
treatment he receives will depend on the accuracy of what he tells
the physician. The patient's belief is deemed sufficient to ensure
the trustworthiness of his statements. 19 Maryland has applied the
same rule when the medical witness was a psychiatrist.20
The situation is quite different, however, when the medical
history is given to the physician solely to qualify him as an expert
witness. Since the patient does not expect medical treatment to
be based on his statements, the underlying rationale for the exception is absent. Indeed, since the patient is conscious of the
pending litigation he may be motivated to falsify his symptoms
15. 277 Md. at 123--24, 353 A.2d at 265-66.
16. [d. at 124-26, 353 A.2d at 266-67.

17. Fisher Body Div. v. Alston, 252 Md. 51, 249 A.2d 130 (1969) (physician who
was visited for treatment was allowed to testify concerning history given by
patient even though no treatment was administered); Adams v. Bensen, 208
Md. 261, 117 A.2d 881 (1955); see Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168
A.2d 501 (1961). The majority of states allow a treating physician to testify to
statements made by his patient. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317
N.E.2d 564 (1974) (rule followed in criminal as well as civil cases); Arabia v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 301 Mass. 397, 17 N.E.2d 202 (1938); Greenfarb v. Arre, 62 N.J. Super. 420, 163 A.2d 173 (1960); Baker v. Industrial
Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc.,
447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972); Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 9
Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 (1959); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 292 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1721, at 73 (3d ed. 1940).
18. Adams v. Bensen, 208 Md. 261, 266--67, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955); see State v.
Orsini, 155 Conn. 367, 232 A.2d 907 (1967); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447
Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972); Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34
P.2d 687 (1934); Smith v. Earst Hardware Co., 61 Wash. 2d 75, 377 P.2d
258 (1962).
19. 277 Md. at 123--24, 353 A.2d at 265; MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at § 292. See
Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 137 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Brown v. Blauvelt,
152 Conn. 275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Bober v. Independent Planting Corp., 28
N.]. 160, 145 A.2d 463 (1958) ; Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539,
186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772
(1972) ; Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934).
20. See Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715, 717 (1962);
Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 556-57, 171 A.2d 699, 706-07, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 906 (1961).
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or at least to exaggerate.21 For these reasons Maryland has not
extended the exception to non-treating physicians.22 In Candella,
the court of appeals recognized that some states do allow the nontreating physician both to state medical conclusions and to relate
the patient's history on which those conclusions are based. 23 Those
states admit the patient's history not as substantive evidence, but
for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the conclusion reached
by the physician. The Candella court declined to adopt this approach and reaffirmed its prior decisions on this point.24
Having decided that Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony did not come
within any exception to the hearsay rule, the court next addressed
the question of whether the testimony should have been admitted
by the circuit court in light of the legislature's directive in Section
11 that the Commission not be bound by the common law rules of
evidence. 25 In the past the court of appeals has recognized the
import of this directive and in some cases has sanctioned the admission of hearsay in the trial de novo. The court has allowed
awards to be based on hearsay, but only where the circumstances
provided special assurance that the evidence was trustworthy.26
The basic approach which Maryland has adopted in determining
the admissibility of hearsay in compensation cases was first articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy.27 In Mealy, the court of appeals
upheld the circuit court's admission of statements which a deceased
21. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66; MCCoRMICK, supra note 17, at § 293. See
Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Sutherland v. Kroger
Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).
22. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 26~6; see Riddle v. Dickens, 241 Md. 579, 217 A.2d
304 (1966) ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 562, 168 A.2d 501 (1961); Parker
v. State, 189 Md. 244, 55 A.2d 784 (1947); accord, Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn.
275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Gotfrey v. Sakurada, 169 Neb. 879, 101 N.W.2d 470
(1960); Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933);
Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934).
23. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. See, e.g., Groat v. Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 350, 58 P.2d 200 (1936); Cronin v. Fitchburg & L.
St. Ry., 181 Mass. 202, 63 N.E. 335 (1902); Johnson v. Bangor Ry. & Elec.
Co., 125 Me. 88, 131 A. 1 (1925); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski,
82 Nev. 448,420 P.2d 853 (1967); Waldroop v. Driver-Miller Plumbing & Heating Corp., 61 N.M. 412, 301 P.2d 521 (1956); Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Jackson,
63 Okla. 32, 162 P. 823 (1917); Kraetti v. North Coast Transp. Co., 166 Wash.
186, 6 P.2d 609 (1932).
24. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266.
25. ld.
26. See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967);
Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938); Standard Oil
Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). In other cases hearsay has also
been held admissible, but for different reasons. See Horn Ice Cream Co. v.
Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v.
Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158
Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930), which are more fully discussed in notes 42-46
supra and accompanying text.
27. 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
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workman had made to his wife and attending physicians to the
effect that he had fallen at work and struck his side at a spot where
a malignant growth later developed. There was no other evidence
of accidental injury.28 The court noted that the statute which provides for appeals from the Commission to the circuit courts does
not direct those courts to relax their established rules of evidence
"in any degree or under any conditions."29 Yet in the court's view,
to apply the same evidentiary rules to these appeals which are
usually applied in the circuit courts would deprive claimants of
the benefit of the investigative freedom granted to the Commission
by Section 11.s0 The court concluded that
[T]he courts are required to adapt themselves somewhat
to the increased latitude allowed to the commission, and
that this adaptation must at the same time, and as far as
it can consistently be done, avoid abandonment of cautions
and safeguards which seem necessary, not only for constitutional due process of law, but also for the assurance of
reliability in the basis of adjudication. We conclude that
the courts are not intended to withdraw from litigants
under the act all the precautions which in the course of
time have been worked out as essentials of orderly, certain
justice. And whatever foundation there may be for objections to the rule excluding hearsay in its full extent,
it must be admitted that there is still a large residuum of
necessary precaution embodied in it.sl
The court declined to fix any absolute standard for the admissibility of hearsay in compensation cases, but decided that the statements of the deceased worker were admissible. The statements
were repeated by three or four witnesses, referred to a simple fact
and left no room for substantial misunderstanding. These circum28. ld. at 252-53, 127 A. at 851.
29. ld. at 254, 127 A. at 851. In the court's view, the allowance of an appeal must
intend a review of the Commission decisions with some advantage from the
special training of the circuit court judges. It is interesting to note that, at the
time Mealy was decided, Commissioners were not required to be lawyers. The
requirement that they "be selected from those who have been admitted to the
practice of law in this State" was added in Law of Apri110, 1957, ch. 584, § 1 (c),
[1957] Laws of Md. 969 (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 1 (c)
(1964». Now that Commissioners have legal training, they should be better able
to use safely the broad discretion given to them by the legislature. Their decisions seemingly should require less oversight by circuit court judges on questions of law.
30. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. at 254, 127 A. at 851-52. Here the court
of appeals impliedly recognized the futility of allowing evidence, which would
not meet common law competency standards, to support a finding before the
Commission if the same evidence is to be excluded on review de novo. Such a
double standard would ensure that the party who successfully relies on such
evidence at the commission hearing would face reversal on review de novo. Thus,
any benefit provided to a claimant by Section 11 would be lost.
31. ld. at 254, 127 A. at 852.
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stances, the court concluded, provided adequate assurance of reliability even though the statements were hearsay.32
Mealy was decided in 1925, eleven years after the creation of
the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Since then the court
of appeals has expressly avoided issuing a binding rule for the
admissibility of hearsay in compensation cases. Instead, it has
directed that each case be decided on its particular facts. 33 A
review of the pertinent cases reveals that the court has been very
reluctant to extend the admission of hearsay much beyond the
limits defined by the circumstances in Mealy.
In Spence v. Bethlehem Steel CO.,34 the workman died of pneumonia. The only evidence that the disease was caused by an accidental injury consisted of statements by the workman, testified to
by his wife and his doctor, that he had been exposed to poisonous
gas while working in burning tar. The wife also testified to the
physical appearance of her husband when he returned from work
the day of the incident. 35 In addition to repeating the deceased's
statement, the doctor testified that lobar pneumonia could be induced by exposure to gas. 36 The court of appeals upheld the admissibility of the statements,37 and at the same time declared,
"[t]his court has not said . . . that the safeguards against the
admission generally of hearsay evidence in compensation cases
should be disregarded, but that [hearsay] should be received with
great caution . ..."38 Here as in Mealy, the court found the deceased's statements were sufficiently reliable to permit their admission. The statements were made by a workman whose subsequent death had prevented his testimony, were closely related to
the physical condition of the workman and were made promptly
after the injury.39
The most recent case to rule on the admissibility of hearsay in
a compensation case was Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny.40 In
Quasny, the workman suffered a fatal heart attack when a barrel
he was loading onto a truck slipped. Unusual exertion was required
to return the barrel to its upright position. The hearsay was
ld. at 255, 127 A. at 852.
Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 580, 227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967).
173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).
ld. at 543-44,197 A. at 304.
ld. at 544-45, 197 A. at 304-05.
The Commission originally denied a claim by the workman's widow. Her appeal
to the circuit level court was heard on the record made before the Commission.
The circuit court also denied the widow's claim and instructed a verdict for the
employer. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial. ld.
at 553, 197 A. at 308.
38. ld. at 549,197 A. at 307 (emphasis added).
39. ld. at 55(}"52, 197 A. at 307-08.
40. 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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similar to that in Mealy and in Spence. The testimony of Quasny's
widow consisted of her husband's statements to her about how the
accident had occurred. Both the Commission and the circuit court
admitted her testimony and awarded compensation. In affirming,
the court of appeals noted that Quasny was hospitalized immediately after the accident, received last rites from a priest, and was
physically unable to make statements until he spoke to his wife
about six hours after the accident. In this totality of circumstances,
the court found sufficient indicia of reliability to admit Quasny's
hearsay statement.41
In other cases, the court of appeals has sanctioned the admission of hearsay when it was merely cumulative. In Horn Ice Cream
Co. v. Yost,42 the worker was knocked down when an ice cream
tub fell against him. He died sometime later. The mother of the
deceased worker testified that he said he had suffered a blow to
the head. 43 In affirming an award of compensation, the court of
appeals noted that the testimony of three eyewitnesses to the
accident permitted the inference that the tub had struck the
workman on the head. In light of the eyewitness testimony, the
court reasoned that it was not apparent how the admission of the
mother's hearsay testimony prejudiced the insurer.44 Similarly, in
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor4 5 and in Waddell George's Creek
Coal Co. v. Chisholm,46 the circuit courts admitted hearsay state41. ld. at 580, Z27 A.2d at 24.
42. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933).
43. ld. at 26, 163 A. at 824. The review de novo was based on the record produced
at the Commission hearing. The circuit court admitted the hearsay testimony of
Yost's mother and affirmed the award of the Commission.
44. ld. at 30,163 A. at 825.
45. 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930). In Traylor, the issue was whether the pneumonia which caused the workman's death resulted from accidental exposure to
gas on the job or from natural causes. The circuit court permitted the wife to
testify that on several occasions when her husband returned from work he
appeared very ill and complained that he had been gassed. Other workers testified
to seeing the deceased on the occasions in question working in an engine pit full
of gas. The court of appeals said that the statements from the deceased were
merely cumulative when considered with other direct evidence tending to sustain
the theory that death resulted from the exposure. The court found that the considerations which influenced the admission of hearsay in Mealy were weightier
than those present in the facts of Traylor. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
it would frustrate the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation statute
to hold that the admission of Traylor's statement was reversible error. ld. at
124, 148 A. at 249.
46. 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1936). In Chisholm, the workman died as a result of
an operation necessitated by a hernia. At issue was whether the hernia resulted
from an accident in the mine where the workman was employed. The workman's
wife and co-workers testified before the Commission that the deceased told them
he sustained the hernia when he accidentally slipped while moving a rock. The
testimony on the record from the Commission hearing was admitted before the
circuit court which granted an award. In affirming, the court of appeals found
no reason to exclude the hearsay because, in addition to the hearsay, other testimony supported the conclusion of accidental injury.
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ments made by workmen who subsequently died. The statements
were each made to a relative concerning a simple fact of how the
injury was incurred and therefore the statements closely fit the
factual pattern of Mealy. The court of appeals allowed the hearsay
to stand largely because there was other testimony to the same
effect as the hearsay. Thus the court did little more than find that
any error committed was harmless and that the Commission and
the trier of facts on appeal could have made the same inference
of accidental injury even without the challenged statements. In
this sense, Yost, Traylor and Chisholm do not represent a digression from the common law rules of evidence.
When the court of appeals has not found sufficient assurance
of reliability, it has approved the exclusion of hearsay evidence in
compensation cases at the trial de novo. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Ziegenfuss,47 the claimant sought compensation for a hernia allegedly caused by an accidental injury on the job. One of the
prerequisites for compensation for a hernia is proof that the hernia
did not exist prior to the injury.48 To meet this requirement the
claimant offered her own testimony as to what the employer's
physician had told her during a medical examination eight months
prior to the alleged injury.49 In holding this testimony inadmissible
before the circuit court, the court of appeals ruled that despite
the relaxation of the ordinary rules of evidence in compensation
cases, a person with no medical education could not meet the
requirement of definite proof by testifying to a medical opinion
given to her by a doctor. The court reasoned that the admission of
this testimony would carry the relaxation of the rules too far.50
In Standard Gas Equipment Co. v. Baldwin,51 the court of appeals
held it was error to allow the reading of the official death certificate
of the deceased workman at the trial in the circuit court. The
information concerning the cause of death on the certificate was
provided by the widow who did not see her husband alive after
his alleged injury. She could not have gotten the information from
her husband and she was not present at the accident herself. The
court decided this hearsay lacked the indicia of reliability which
had persuaded the court to admit hearsay in other cases.1i2
47. 187 Md. 283, 49 A.2d 793 (1946).
48. ld. at 288-89,49 A.2d at 795; MD. ANN. CoDE art. 101, § 36(5) (1964).
49. The commission denied compensation on the grounds that the claimant failed to
show she had no pre-existing hernia. The circuit court, with a jury, decided the
issue in her favor and reversed the order of the Commission. The court of
appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the order of
the Commission. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 187 Md. at 285, 49 A.2d
at 794.
50. ld. at 294-95, 49 A.2d at 798-99.
51. 152 Md. 321,136 A. 644 (1927).
52. ld. at 326-27,136 A. at 646.
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These compensation cases in which hearsay testimony was
offered at the circuit court trial indicate that such evidence may
be admissible, but only if the circumstances provide special assurance that the testimony is trustworthy. The court of appeals,
in Candella, found that the testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum lacked
this assurance. 53 In reaching this conclusion the court emphasized
certain facts. The psychiatrist's opinion was based entirely on
statements made by Mrs. Candella. 54 She had been referred to
him by her attorney to assist in preparing her case. She realized
she would not be treated by the psychiatrist and related her history
solely to qualify him as an expert. 55 The court found a great
distinction between the reliability of the statements made by Mrs.
Candella and the reliability of the hearsay statements held admissible in prior compensation cases. In those prior cases the
statements related to simple facts which left "'no room for substantial misunderstanding,' "56 while the subject matter of Dr.
Teitelbaum's opinion involved a complex area of medical science.
Therefore, the court found that "the statements on which the
[psychiatrist's] conclusions were based cannot withstand the close
scrutiny of hearsay testimony mandated by our prior decisions."57
In scrutinizing the testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum, the court
emphasized the unreliability of statements made to a non-treating
psychiatrist. Alternatively the court might have analyzed more
closely the nature of psychiatry and found a similarity between
statements to a non-treating psychiatrist and the physical examination by a non-treating physician. Even in jurisdictions like
Maryland where a non-treating physician is not permitted to give
an opinion based on statements from the patient,58 he is permitted
to give an opinion based on his personal observations and measurements of the patient's physical condition.59 His opinion is admissible because his special training qualifies him to interpret these
physical conditions60 and because it is not based on any statements.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267.
I d. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264.
!d. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267.
Id. Here the court quoted from the leading case, Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy,
147 Md. 249, 255, 127 A. 850, 852 (1925).
277 Md. at 126, 353 A2d at 267.
See note 22 supra.
In Adams v. BensetJ, 208 Md. 261, 117 A.2d 881 (1955), the court ruled that it
would have been error to allow the non-treating physician to give an opinion
based on the history recited by the patient, but it was not error for him to testify
that the patient winced and was in obvious discomfort when the physician flexed
the patient's wrist. In Francies v. Debaltgh, 194 Md. 448, 457, 71 A.2d 455,
458-59 (1950), the court permitted a non-treating physician to give an opinion
based on observation of both the patient and x-rays of the patient's chest, but the
court would not allow an opinion based on statements from the patient himself.
See Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 505-06, 20 A2d 491, 493 (1941).
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The nature of psychiatry, however, is different from other areas of
medical science. This fact was at least indirectly recognized by
the court in Candella. 61 In diagnosing diseases or conditions of
the mind, the psychiatrist relies largely on the patient's statements
to formulate his opinion. 62 Thus, statements to a psychiatrist are
analogous to physical observations by a physician. Because a
psychiatrist is trained to analyze not only what the patient says
but how he says it,63 he is specially qualified to evaluate the credibility of the patient's statements. The Commissioners and judges
should be allowed to rely on the psychiatrist's ability to analyze
these subjective factors in the formulation of the psychiatric
opinion just as they are allowed to rely on the expertise of the
physician to analyze physical symptoms. 64
Of course, statements to a non-treating psychiatrist are still
hearsay according to the common law rule,65 but it has been
61. Concerning the nature of a psychiatric examination, the court said:
As one might expect in the case of a psychiatrist, his examination consisted solely of hearing the subjective statements furnished by the claimant,
and his conclusions were based exclusively on that informatioIL
277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267.
62.
Unlike other medical examinations done with the aid of instruments, blood
tests, x-rays, and other modalities, the mental status examination is basically a verbal relationship between patient and psychiatrist.
R. COHEN, TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES 40 (1970).
The end result of this verbal relationship is the formulation of the psychiatric
opinion. One writer describes the process as follows:
Through relatively indirect questions, the psychiatrist seeks to gain a
comprehensive picture of the background of the patient, the personality
characteristics of the principal members of the family, the nature of the
social environment and, most important of all, the emotional attitudes and
adaptive techniques of the patient
A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 306 (1968).
63.
[T]he matter of factual accuracy is relatively unimportant, since the point
of real diagnostic significance is how the patient views and evaluates his
experiences. We do not expect the "facts" which are presented to be historically accurate. However, they are the most accurate presentation of
the patient's attitudes about these facts. Since these are the forces which
motivate his behavior, they must be regarded as the crucial data. During
the course of the interview, the psychiatrist "listens with his third ear";
in other words, he listens for the spoken and unspoken clues to deeper
emotional attitudes which the patient holds unbeknownst to himself.
A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 306 (1968) (emphasis in original;
footnotes omitted).
64. The law recognizes the psychiatrist as an expert, but the rule excluding the
opinion of a non-treating psychiatrist fails to take into account the ability of the
psychiatrist to analyze not only what the patient says but how he says it. The
rule mistakenly presupposes that the non-treating psychiatrist is unaware of the
patient's motive to falsify and that he accepts the patient's statements at face
value. Moreover, the danger in permitting a non-treating psychiatrist to give an
opinion based on possibly falsified statements is not significantly greater than
the danger in permitting a non-treating physician to give an opinion based on
falsified physical symptoms.
65. See Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962); Connor
v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 (1961).
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established that the mere fact that testimony is hearsay does not
exclude it from compensation cases. 66 Moreover, a minority of
states sees no reason to exclude the opinion of a non-treating physician based on the patient's history.67 By adopting this less restrictive approach, at least for compensation cases, the court of
appeals could have found sufficient assurance that Dr. Teitelbaum's
opinion was reliable. At the same time, the court would have
struck a more even balance between the latitude contemplated by
Section 11 and the need for adequate safeguards in the admission
of evidence in compensation cases.
Aside from its particular evidentiary conclusion, the court in
Candella again left unresolved the question of when hearsay
testimony is admissible in compensation cases. After analyzing
the pertinent cases, one is tempted to conclude that the only hearsay
statements that will be admissible are those of a deceased employee
describing a simple fact of how he was injured. But the court has
repeatedly denied such a narrow interpretation. 6s It continues to
reject the adoption of a binding rule to govern hearsay in these
cases. 69 Instead, the court has proposed that previous cases be
followed and that each future case be decided on its particular
facts.7o
The court's attempt to balance the informality and liberality
desirable in Workmen's Compensation cases 71 with the precautions
that have come to be essential in any system of orderly justice72
has produced several recognizable, though vague, guidelines. Generally, the Commissioners are not required to follow closely the
rules of evidence. 73 But there must be limits to the discretion
allowed to the Commissioners in admitting and excluding evidence
in order to achieve a necessary degree of certainty in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Article. 74 The circuit
courts in reviewing compensation cases are required to modify
their own criteria for the admission of evidence in light of the
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

See notes 27-41 supra and accompanying text.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 580, 2Z7 A2d 20, 24 (1967).
277 Md. at 126, 353 A2d at 266; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 MeL
572, 580,227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967) ; see Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539,
197 A. 302 (1938) ; Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930); Standard Oil
Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 266; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md.
572,580,227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967) ; see Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539,
See Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 31, 163 A. 823, 826 (1933).
See Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967); Standard
Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850, 851-52 (1927).
Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 31, 163 A. 823, 826 (1933).
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latitude allowed to the Commission. 75 More specifically, hearsay
testimony will not be barred merely because it is hearsay,76 but
such evidence is only to be admitted with "great caution."77 There
must be circumstances in the case which provide assurance that
the evidence is worthy of belief. 78 In adopting this approach the
court reasons that caution is necessary to satisfy the requirements
of constitutional due process of law and to ensure the reliability
of the grounds on which compensation decisions are based.79
Maryland is not alone in approaching the admission of hearsay
in compensation cases with caution. This fact becomes evident
when one considers the manner in which other jurisdictions have
treated hearsay testimony in compensation cases.SO A distinct
minority of states retains the common law rules of evidence in
compensation cases and treats the admission of hearsay as reversible error. 81 A majority of states employs a less restrictive,
though not entirely satisfactory, approach known as the "residuum
rule."82 First propounded by the New York Court of Appeals in

75. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850, 852 (1927).
76. See 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md.
572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967); Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A.
302 (1938); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1927).
77. Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 549, 197 A. 302, 307 (1938).
78. !d. at 549-50, 197 A2d at 307; Standard Gas Equip. Co. v. Baldwin, 152
Md. 321, 326, 136 A 644, 646 (1927).
79. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 252, 254,127 A. 850, 852 (1927).
80. A thorough treatment of the use of hearsay in compensation cases in the various
states is beyond the scope of this note. The discussion of other jurisdictions in
the text is intended to show Maryland's relative position on this question. It
should be noted that in developing its position the Maryland court acted independently without reliance on the case law of any other state. For a full discussion of the treatment of hearsay in compensation cases see 3 A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 79.00-79.42 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON] ; Annot., 36 AL.R.3d 12, §§ 25-29 (1971); for earlier cases see Note,
The Common Law Rules and Rules Governing the Reception of Evidence by
Workmen's Compensation Commissions, 24 IOWA L. REv. 576 (1939); Ross,
The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidmce in Proceedings before
Workmen's Compensation Commissions, 36 HARV. L. REv. 263 (1923).
81. Larson notes that this approach is now largely limited to states with court
administered compensation systems. LARSON, supra note 80, at § 79.22. See
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963); Lilieblom v. Dept.
of Labor & Indus., 57 Wash. 2d 136, 356 P.2d 307 (1960).
82. Larson reports that the maiority of states foIlow the residuum rule in compensation cases. LARSON, supra note 80, at § 79.22. But see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.12, at 313 (1958); Davis, The Residuum Rule ilJ
Administrative Law, 28 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 22 (1972). In these works on
general administrative law, Davis warns that it is not clear that the residuum
rule actually prevails in most states. Many courts pay lip service to the rule but
employ subtle and weIl concealed methods to avoid the effect of the rule. Thus
those courts often reach the same results as the courts which expressly reject
the rule. For further analysis of the residuum rule, see Note, The Residuum
Rule and Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of Necessity, 13 RUTGERS L. REv.
254 (1959).
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Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice CO.,83 the residuum rule allows the
admission of hearsay but requires that an award not be supported
by hearsay alone. According to the rule, there must be in addition
to the hearsay, a residuum of legally competent evidence on which
to base the award.84 While the residuum rule has been widely
accepted,85 it has also been criticized. 86 This criticism stems mainly
from the fact that the states which have adopted it also have
statutes which direct that their commissioners not be bound by
the common law or technical rules of evidence. 87 The dissenting
judge in Carroll recognized this apparent contradiction between
statute and judicial interpretation, when he questioned whether
it was reasonable to believe that the legislature intended to allow
the commissioners to admit hearsay evidence but at the same time
to prohibit them from making any legal use of it.88 Remaining are
83. 218 N.Y. 435,113 N.E. 507 (1916).
84. [d. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509. In Carroll, the workman's dependents claimed compensation for his death, and offered in evidence statements of the deceased that
he had been struck by a block of ice. Eyewitnesses denied that such an injury
had been received. The court ruled that while the commission is not limited by
the common law rules of evidence and it may in its discretion accept any evidence that is offered, still there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made. The impact of the residuum rule was
lessened somewhat in Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d 886
(1943), which upheld a compensation award based on hearsay statements of an
employee. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the established
circumstances in the case left little doubt that the statements were substantially
true. In Altschuller, the court stated that the necessary residuum can be found
in corroborating circumstances which enhance the reliability of the hearsay.
Thus the gap between the residuum rule and the approach taken by Maryland
may not be as great as it first appears. See LARSON, supra note 80, at § 79.24.
Nonetheless the Carroll case has not been overruled by the New York Court
of Appeals and later cases show that the residuum rule is still in force. See, e.g.,
Comstock v. Goetz Oil Corp., 286 App. Div. 132, 142 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1955).
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Colo. 591, 328 P.Zd 384 (1958);
Zawisza v. Quality Name Plate, Inc., 149 Conn. 115, 176 A.2d 578 (1961);
Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921); Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961); Ramey v. State Compensation Comm'r, 150 W. Va. 402, 146 S.E.2d 579 (1966). Pennsylvania has incorporated the concept of the residuum rule into its Workmen's Compensation
Statute, providing that the board shall not "be bound by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence ... but all findings of fact shall be based upon sufficient competent evidence to justify same." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 834 (Purdon
Supp. 1976-77).
86. Wigmore notes that the residuum rule assumes that all legally admissible evidence is reliable and that all other evidence is unreliable. Common experience
belies both assumptions. Deceptive evidence often gets into trials conducted
under strict evidence rules, while some evidence, upon which a prudent person
would base decisions in his private affairs, is barred. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 4(b), at 41-42 (3d ed. 1940).
87. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.135 (1962); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 23-941 (Supp.
1976-77); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-298 (West 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-56
(West 1959); N.Y. WORK. COMPo LAW § 118 (McKinney 1965); UTAH CoDE
ANN. § 35-1-88 (1953); W. VA. CODE § 23-1-15 (1973).
88. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 446, 113 N.E. 507, 511 (1916)
(Seabury, J., dissenting).
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those states which admit hearsay and impliedly or specifically reject
the residuum rule. These states take the least restrictive view of
the use of hearsay in compensation cases. In their view, hearsay
evidence is not only admissible, but under certain circumstances
an award can be supported by hearsay alone. 89
Although Maryland adheres to the least restrictive of these
three approaches,Do the method used by the court of appeals to set
a standard for the admissibility of hearsay can be criticized on the
grounds that the guidelines are so general that they provide little
real direction to the Commissioners, judges or parties. The court
of appeals attempted to answer this criticism in Horn Ice Cream
Co. 'V. Yost.Dl The court conceded that the problem of reconciling
the latitude allowed to the Commission by Section 11 with the
necessity for reliability in the admission of evidence has not been
satisfactorily solved.92 The court questioned, however, whether the
problem is susceptible to final resolution. D3 The court said that
while it could set the outer limits of the discretion given to the
Commission, it would be difficult to define those limits with any
greater precision.D4

89. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has ruled that hearsay statements are
properly admissible in evidence before the Commission and the Commission has
the discretion to give weight to the hearsay statements in arriving at its finding
of facts. Williams v. Fuqua, 199 Va. 709, 101 S.E.2d 562 (1958). The Virginia
court had previously decided that hearsay evidence is admissible under the Workmen's Compensation Act and could be used as the basis of an award. Derby v.
Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 49 S.E.2d 417 (1948). In American Furniture Co. v.
Graves, 141 Va. 1, 126 S.E. 213 (1925), the court noted that other courts with
. similar statutes had held that, although hearsay evidence is admissible, an award
can be set aside if other non-hearsay evidence is not sufficient to support the
award. The Virginia court rejected this approach, stating that such an interpretation would make the statutory provision allowing hearsay a senseless and
useless thing.
The California Workmen's Compensation Act provides that "[n]o order,
decision, award, or rule shall be invalidated because of the admission into the
record, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible
under the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure." CAL. LAB.
CoDE § 5709 (West 1971). This provision appears to be designed specifically to
negate the residuum rule. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.12,
at 319 (1958). California has adopted a rule that hearsay standing alone may
support an award if the Commission finds that the evidence carries sufficient
convincing force. See, e.g., Sada v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 363,
78 P.2d 1127 (1938); Hendricks v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 25 Cal. App.
2d 534, 78 P.2d 189 (1938); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 195 Cal. 174, 231 P. 996 (1924).
90. The Maryland Court of Appeals has impliedly rejected the residuum rule by
upholding awards of compensation even when the only evidence of an accidental,
work-related injury was hearsay. See notes 27-41 supra and accompanying text.
91. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933).
92. ld. at 31-32, 163 A. at 826.
93. ld.
94. ld.
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In Candella, the court of appeals neither added new guidelines
nor clarified the existing ones. The case simply provides yet
another example of a type of hearsay which will not be permitted
in compensation cases - the opinion of a non-treating physician
or psychiatrist based solely on the history recited by the patient.
The result is that in future compensation cases when hearsay evidence arises under any different set of facts, the guidelines are
as unclear as ever.
Perhaps more disturbing is whether the court of appeals in
Candella and in previous cases has adequately carried out the
intent of the legislature embodied in Section 11 that the Commission not be bound by the common law rules of evidence. The court
has recognized the import of that section in holding that the mere
fact that testimony is hearsay will not bar its admission. 95 But
the court has subjected this type of evidence to such close scrutiny
that the hearsay rule is substantially intact in compensation cases.
In light of the court's own admonition that the statute is social
legislation and should be liberally construed to achieve its general
purpose,96 a less stringent standard is preferable. Despite assertions to the contrary, one might even argue that the court has
done little more than carve out a new exception to the hearsay
rule, that exception being statements of deceased workmen concerning a simple fact related to the accidental injury in a compensation case. Admittedly, under these circumstances a strict adherence to the hearsay rule would have a devastating effect on the
claim of a deceased workman's dependents. Thus, the court's prior
decisions have at least partially reduced the harsh effect of the
hearsay rule in compensation cases. But, as Candella demonstrates,
there is still a wide gap between the bold directive in the statute
and the close scrutiny which has been applied by the court.

Kevin F. O'Neill

95. See notes 27-46 suPra and accompanying text.
96. See note 4 suPra and accompanying text.

